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PREEMPTING STATE E-VERIFY REGULATIONS: A
CASE STUDY OF ARIZONA’S IMPROPER LEGISLATION
IN THE FIELD OF “IMMIGRATION-RELATED
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES”
Rachel Feller
Abstract: In 1996, Congress established E-Verify, a program that allows employers to
confirm the employment eligibility of new hires by using a federal electronic database.
Although the federal government makes the program voluntary for employers, some states
and municipalities have enacted legislation requiring the program’s use to prevent the
employment of undocumented workers. Some of these state laws have been challenged in
federal court on the grounds that they are preempted by federal law, particularly the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Courts have divided on this issue.
This Comment explains the boundaries of preemption in the context of E-Verify legislation
by using Arizona’s E-Verify law and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicanos por la Causa
v. Napolitano as a case study. It argues that state E-Verify provisions may sanction
employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers only if the sanction is based on a
federal finding that the employer violated IRCA. Specifically, this Comment argues that the
Ninth Circuit erred by classifying Arizona’s E-Verify statute as an employment law and by
allowing Arizona to revoke business licenses based on a state judge’s finding that the
employer knowingly hired undocumented workers. This Comment argues that courts should
recognize that Congress created and occupied a field of federal regulation: immigrationrelated employment practices.

INTRODUCTION
The United States is home to approximately twelve million
undocumented immigrants.1 This population has grown in recent years,2
and states have filled what they perceive as gaps in federal immigration
law by regulating employers’ ability to hire undocumented workers.3 In
2007 alone, state legislatures passed 240 immigration-related bills—
nearly triple the number passed in 2006—many of which addressed

1. PEW HISPANIC CTR., TRENDS IN UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION: UNDOCUMENTED INFLOW
NOW TRAILS LEGAL INFLOW 1 (2008), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php
?ReportID=94, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev
289n1.pdf.
2. Id.
3. IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007 ENACTED
STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION 1 (2008), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007Immigrationfinal.pdf, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n3.pdf.
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employment.4 In their efforts to curb the employment of undocumented
immigrants, many states have turned to E-Verify, a federal program that
allows employers to check new hires’ employment eligibility
automatically, using an electronic database.5 Between 2006 and 2008,
fourteen states required, encouraged, or limited the use of the E-Verify
system,6 and six additional states were considering similar legislation as
of May 2009.7 Arizona lies at one end of the spectrum, requiring every
4. Id. at 2 (stating that 29 bills passed in 20 states addressed immigrant employment).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part IV. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-215
(West 2007) (requiring E-Verify’s use by all employers); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-102
(West 2006) (requiring use by Colorado contractors and subcontractors working on public
contracts); GA. CODE ANN., § 48-7-21.1 (2007) (requiring use by all Georgia public employers and
their contractors and subcontractors); Idaho Exec. Order No. 2006-40, (Dec. 13, 2006) (mandating
use by state agencies and their contractors); Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act, 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/12 (West 2007) (prohibiting E-Verify’s use until proven 99 percent accurate);
Minnesota Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008) (mandating use by state agencies and contractors
for public projects over $50,000); Laws Regarding Illegal Aliens and Immigration Status
Verification, H.B. 1549 (Mo. 2008) (requiring Missouri contractors receiving state contracts of
more that $5,000 to use E-Verify); Mississippi Employment Protection Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 7111-3 (2008) (requiring participation by all public and private employers through staggered
compliance date requirements depending on the size of the business); Technical Corrections Act,
2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 259, §23.1(a) (2006) (mandating participation by North Carolina state
agencies); Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1313 (2007)
(requiring participation by all Oklahoma public employers and their contractors and subcontractors);
S.C. CODE §§ 8-14-20, 41-8-20 (mandating use by all South Carolina employers); Illegal
Immigration Control Order, Rhode Island Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Mar. 27, 2008) (requiring use by
state agencies and their contractors and subcontractors); Act Relative to the Employment of Illegal
Aliens, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-103 (2007) (encouraging E-Verify’s use in Tennessee by not
imposing sanctions on employers who check employee status with the program); Identity
Documents and Verification Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-11-103 (2008) (requiring the program’s
use by all Utah public employers and their contractors and subcontractors). See also IMMIGRANT
POLICY PROJECT, supra note 3, at 8–10; IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/EVerifyFAQ.htm, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n6.pdf.
7. See Arkansas Taxpayer and Citizenship Protection Act of 2009, H.B. 1093, 87th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2009/R/Pages/
BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1093; H.B. 1098, 116th Gen. Assem. (Ind. 2009), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2009/IN/IN1098.1.html; H.B. 441, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2009), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/09RS/HB441.htm; Nebraska Fair and Legal
Employment Act, Legis. B. 34, 101st Leg.. (Neb. 2009), available at
http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov/bills/view_bill.php?DocumentID=6261; Illegal Immigration,
H.B. 0103, 60th Leg., 2009 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2009), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2009/
Titles/HB0103.htm; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0695 (2009), available at http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2009/htm/ga-0695.htm. Permanent copies of the state bills and
Texas attorney general opinion letter are available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev289n7.pdf. See generally Austin T. Fragomen, New Challenges in Complying with State
Immigration Employment Laws, 86 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1037 (2009) (providing an overview of
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private employer to use E-Verify or risk losing its business license.8
Illinois lies at the other end; the state has virtually prohibited employers
from using the system until it is more accurate.9 Businesses and
immigrant-rights groups have sued to invalidate many of the state laws,
arguing in part that federal law preempts state regulation of immigrant
employment. The scope of this area of law is changing quickly both in
terms of state regulation and court decisions.
In addition to providing an overview of state E-Verify laws and the
legal challenges they have faced, this Comment pays particular attention
to the Legal Arizona Workers Act. Using the Arizona law as a case
study,10 this Comment closely examines Chicanos por la Causa v.
Napolitano,11 a Ninth Circuit opinion upholding the law against a facial
preemption challenge. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion was in error. States may revoke an employer’s business license
for knowingly employing undocumented workers, but only after a
federal finding of wrongdoing. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is to the
contrary, and the court erred when it started its preemption analysis by
asking whether Arizona’s regulation was an employment regulation or
an immigration regulation.
Courts need not face the difficult decision of categorizing state
regulations as either immigration regulations or employment regulations.
As this Comment demonstrates, when Congress passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986,12 it created a new regulatory
field: immigration-related employment practices.13 Part I reviews the
state laws relating to employment verification).
8. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-215 (West 2007); see
also infra Part IV.A. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Arizona law against a facial challenge. Chicanos
por la Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), amending on denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc, and superseding Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2008).
9. Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/12 (West 2007).
In March 2009, an Illinois federal district court invalidated the law under the Supremacy Clause.
United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-215.
11. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), amending on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, and
superseding Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (relevant sections
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
13. In the Immigration Reform and Control Act, Congress used the term “Unfair ImmigrationRelated Employment Practices” to refer primarily to discriminatory hiring. Id. §1324b. This
Comment will apply the term to include employer sanctions that result from hiring undocumented
workers.
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federal government’s plenary power over immigration, and shows that
federal regulatory control has deepened over time. Part II introduces the
federal statutes that regulate the employment of undocumented workers
and that provide employers with tools to comply with regulations. It
pays particular attention to one of those tools: E-Verify. Part III explains
the doctrine of federal preemption, which invalidates state and local
laws. Part IV discusses why states have chosen to regulate the hiring of
undocumented workers and provides an overview of such state laws,
with particular focus on the Legal Arizona Workers Act. Part V
examines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicanos por la Causa, Inc. v.
Napolitano and introduces decisions by federal district courts. Finally,
Part VI argues that states may sanction employers for knowingly hiring
undocumented workers only after a federal finding of wrongdoing. It
argues that Chicanos por la Causa is in error because the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly framed the Arizona law as a licensing regulation and did not
consider whether Congress had created and occupied a distinct field:
immigration-related employment practices.
I.

CONGRESS POSSESSES PLENARY POWER OVER
IMMIGRATION AND HAS CREATED AN INCREASINGLY
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY SCHEME

Federal authority over immigration derives from constitutional grants
of power over areas like naturalization14 and commerce with foreign
nations.15 Relying on these express grants of power, as well as the
national government’s inherent sovereign power, federal courts have
long recognized that the power to regulate immigration and deportation
falls squarely within the federal government’s powers.16 Congressional
power over immigration lay dormant throughout the nation’s early years,
as the federal government implemented an open-door policy and did not
regulate immigration.17
Federal regulation of immigration began in 1875,18 and the Supreme
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization”).
15. Id. cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”).
16. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States [hereinafter Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889).
17. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (11th ed. 2008).
18. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 2–3, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting the
entry of Chinese, Japanese, and “oriental” workers without their consent as well as the entry of
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Court soon after recognized Congress’s inherent ability to legislate in
this field.19 In 1882, Congress passed the first comprehensive
immigration laws that prohibited entry by specific groups of people,
including Chinese laborers.20 In the Chinese Exclusion Case,21 the
Supreme Court held that the federal government could exclude
foreigners as an inherent power of sovereignty.22 The Court described
immigration as a matter of national concern, saying that “for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power.”23 During the early twentieth century,
Congress implemented quota systems that limited the entry of foreigners
based upon their countries of origin and adopted other measures to
control immigration into the country.24
In later years, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal government’s
plenary power over immigration and invalidated state laws that
undermined congressional purpose.25 For example, in Hines v.
Davidowitz,26 the Court struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring aliens
to register with the state government,27 reasoning:
[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that
where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, “the act
of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to
prostitutes).
19. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581.
20. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); Immigration Act of
1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
21. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). This case, though widely cited as the first instance in which the Court
recognized the federal government’s power over immigration matters, has been criticized for its
racist tone. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1987).
22. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609 (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one.”).
23. Id. at 606.
24. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952); Alien Enemies Act
of 1918, ch. 55, 40 Stat. 531; Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952); Immigration Act
of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952).
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941).
26. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
27. Id. at 73–74.
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it.”28
The structure of today’s immigration law was created in 1952, when
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).29 This
comprehensive immigration law retained the national-origin quota
system, established new preferences for foreigners with special
employment-related skills, and created deportation policy and
procedures.30 The law did not, however, address the employment of
undocumented workers.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided that in the absence of federal
regulations governing the employment of undocumented immigrants,
states were free to regulate in the area. In DeCanas v. Bica,31 California
farm workers had filed suit under state law against labor contractors,
alleging that they were hiring workers not lawfully admitted to the
United States.32 The Supreme Court started its analysis with a strong
affirmation of federal supremacy over immigration: “Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”33 The Court
faced the question of whether Congress intended to preempt state laws
regulating the employment of undocumented workers.34 The Court
identified the “central concern of the INA” as “the terms and conditions
of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens
lawfully in the country.”35 The hiring of undocumented workers, on the
other hand, was at best a “peripheral concern” of the federal law.36
State laws attempting to determine “who should or should not be
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant
may remain” were regulations of immigration and therefore ran afoul of
the Supremacy Clause,37 but laws regulating only the employment of
undocumented workers were valid exercises of state power under the
Constitution.38 The Court’s opinion includes the implicit recognition that
28. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
29. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).
30. Id.
31. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
32. Id. at 353.
33. Id. at 354.
34. Id. at 353–54.
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. at 360.
37. Id. at 355.
38. Id. at 355–56.
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state law would be preempted if Congress were to comprehensively
regulate the employment of undocumented workers: “[A]bsent
congressional action, [the California law is not] an invalid state
incursion on federal power.”39
II.

CONGRESS REGULATES THE EMPLOYMENT OF
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND PROVIDES OPTIONAL
TOOLS FOR COMPLIANCE

A decade after DeCanas, Congress first addressed the employment of
undocumented workers, passing the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) of 1986.40 IRCA prohibits the employment of
undocumented workers, places the responsibility of document
verification on employers, and creates a complex system of sanctions for
employers that violate the law.41 The new system created its own
problems,42 and Congress responded in 1996 by passing the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),43
which, in part, created optional employment-verification programs to
help employers comply with federal law.44
A.

Congress Enacted IRCA to Prohibit the Employment of
Undocumented Immigrants and to Sanction Employers That
Knowingly Hire Them

Congress finally passed immigration reforms in 1985, after political
and ideological differences prevented it from responding to growing
concerns about immigration during the late 1970s and early 1980s.45 In
1978, Congress created the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy,46 which it charged with issuing recommendations about

39. Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
40. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (relevant sections codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
41. Id.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 104-269, at 108, 128 (1996).
43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 401–05, 110 Stat. 3009-655, 3009-655 to 3009-666 (1996) (codified
at 8 U.S.C. §1101).
44. Id.
45. The House of Representatives passed bills addressing the employment of undocumented
workers in the early 1970s, but the bills stalled in the Senate despite support from Presidents Nixon
and Ford. NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986 4 (1987).
46. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
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comprehensive immigration reform.47 After two years of study and
public hearings, the Commission recommended legislation that made it
illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers.48 Attempts to enact
the Commission’s proposals faced major political opposition from
business, labor, and civil-rights groups,49 and nothing came of the
Commission’s efforts during the early 1980s. Finally, in 1985, two bills
were introduced that eventually merged into IRCA.50 After more
contention and compromise, particularly regarding farm-worker
provisions, Congress approved IRCA in 1986.51 When President Reagan
signed the bill into law, he acclaimed it as “the most comprehensive
reform of our immigration laws since 1952” and called it the product of
“one of the longest and most difficult legislative undertakings of recent
memory.”52
IRCA makes it unlawful for a “person or other entity to hire, or to
recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such
employment.”53 The law establishes the I-9 system, which checks the
employment eligibility of America’s work force. The system places
burdens on both employees and employers:54 New hires must establish
their legal work status by presenting specific documentation, such as
passports or Social Security cards.55 Employers must examine the
documents and attest, under penalty of perjury, that the new hire is
authorized to work in the United States.56 An employer “is considered to
have complied . . . if there was a good faith attempt to comply with the
requirement.”57
Congress vested the authority to enforce IRCA in the Office of the
Attorney General, and gave it some measure of deference in deciding

47. MONTWIELER, supra note 45, at 4.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 6–7.
50. Id. at 10; Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
51. The House approved the conference bill by a vote of 238 to 173, and the Senate 63 to 24.
MONTWIELER, supra note 45, at 15–18.
52. Id. at 539, 543 (Reprint of President Reagan’s Signing Statement).
53. Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).
54. Id. § 1324a(a)–(b).
55. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D).
56. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
57. Id. § 1324a(b)(6)(A).
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which cases merit attention.58 To ensure compliance, IRCA empowers
the Attorney General to impose cease-and-desist orders and fines as
large as ten thousand dollars on employers.59 Before any fine is imposed,
a party has the right to be heard before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).60 The ALJ determines, based upon the preponderance of the
evidence, whether the employer knowingly hired an undocumented
worker, and this decision is subject to judicial review in the federal
circuit courts of appeals.61
IRCA includes a clause expressly invalidating state law: “The
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil
or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.”62 Congress did not clearly define the scope of the
licensing exception, and some states have relied on this exception to
enact statutes that revoke business licenses of employers who knowingly
hire undocumented workers.63
B.

To Help Employers Comply with Immigration Law, Congress
Created E-Verify in 1996, Which It Has Since Expanded

Ten years after IRCA, Congress still grappled with ways to fix the
numerous problems of the federal immigration system.64 In 1996,
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) to address immigration-related issues
ranging from border patrol to document fraud to benefits for aliens.65 To
reduce document fraud under IRCA’s I-9 system,66 Congress established
58. Id. § 1324a(e)(1).
59. Id. § 1324a(e)(4). Paperwork violations carry maximum fines of one thousand dollars. Id. §
1324a(e)(5).
60. Id. § 1324a(e)(3)(A)–(B).
61. Id. § 1324a(e)(3)(C); id. § 1324a(e)(8). This has since led to the creation of a body of
administrative-law jurisprudence on whether an employer knowingly hires an undocumented
worker. See, e.g., 1–8 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS UNDER EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS, UNFAIR IMMIGRATION-RELATED EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND CIVIL PENALTY
DOCUMENT FRAUD LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (2000).
62. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
63. See infra Part IV.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 104-269, at 108, 128 (1996).
65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-655, §§ 3009-655 to 3009-745 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
66. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, pt. 4 at 108, pt. 3 at 128 (1996).

297

FELLER 5-22-09.DOC

Washington Law Review

5/22/2009 4:03 PM

Vol. 84:289, 2009

employment-verification pilot programs and limited the number of
documents that applicants could use to prove work eligibility.67
To facilitate confirmation of workers’ employment eligibility in five
states with high populations of “aliens who are not lawfully present in
the United States,”68 IIRIRA established three pilot programs: the Basic
Pilot Program,69 the Citizen Attestation Pilot Program,70 and the
Machine Readable Document Pilot Program.71 Today, the Basic Pilot
Program is the only one still in existence. Known as “E-Verify,” it
allows employers to confirm an employee’s employment eligibility via
the Internet.72
Congress chose to make use of E-Verify optional. Under IIRIRA,
employers voluntarily elect to participate in the program; the Attorney
General cannot require participation.73 Employers who choose to
participate must enter the document information from an employee’s I-9
form into an Internet-based government database within three working
days of hiring.74 The database crosschecks the information against the
databases of the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),75 and immediately gives a
tentative confirmation or non-confirmation of employment eligibility.76
An employer cannot terminate an individual because of a tentative nonconfirmation.77 Instead, it must inform the employee of the E-Verify

67. Id.
68. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act §§ 401(c)(1)–(3).
69. Id. § 403(a).
70. Id. § 403(b).
71. Id. § 403(c).
72. Dep’t of Homeland Security, E-Verify, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/
gc_1185221678150.shtm (last visited April 26, 2009), permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n72.pdf.
73. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 402(a). Congress decided the
federal government would participate by requiring the executive departments and the legislative
branch to use pilot programs available in the state where they are hiring. Id. § 402(e)(1).
74. Id. § 403(a)(3)(A).
75. The database, as currently structured, is an updated version of the original Basic Pilot
Program. Today the database is run by DHS, which took over the responsibilities of the INS in
2003. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Program Highlights, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis
(follow “Form I-9” hyperlink; then follow “E-Verify” hyperlink; then follow “E-Verify Program
Highlights” hyperlink) (last visited April 26, 2009), permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n75.pdf.
76. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 403(a)(4)(A)–(B).
77. Id. § 403(a)(4)(B)(iii).
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system’s tentative conclusion.78 If the employee contests a tentative nonconfirmation, the federal government investigates and relays a final
decision to the employer within ten working days.79 If DHS issues a final
decision of non-confirmation, the employer must terminate the employee
or notify the Attorney General of continued employment, which creates
a rebuttable presumption that the employer has violated the law.80
E-Verify was originally set to expire four years after it went into
effect, but Congress has consistently extended the program and
expanded its scope. In 2001, Congress passed the Basic Pilot Extension
Act,81 which extended it until 2003. Just before that extension expired,
Congress passed the Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion
Act,82 which required the Secretary of Homeland Security to expand EVerify to all fifty states by December 2004,83 and extended the program
until 2008.84 Congress failed to reach an agreement on the program’s
continued use before the 2008 expiration,85 but President Bush signed
into law a temporary extension through March 6, 2009.86 During recent
budget negotiations, Congress tabled an amendment proposing a fiveyear extension of E-Verify87 but then extended the program until
September 2009 as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill.88 None of
these extensions altered the core provisions of E-Verify, and the

78. Id. §§ 403(a)(4)(B)(i), 404(c).
79. Id. § 404(c). In conjunction with § 403(a)(4)(B)(ii), this provision creates a final nonconfirmation provided the employee does not object to the non-confirmation within the specified
time period.
80. Id. § 403(a)(4)(C).
81. Pub. L. 107-128, 115 Stat. 2407 (2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101, 1324a).
82. Pub. L. 108-156, 17 Stat. 1944 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
83. Id. § 3.
84. Id. § 2.
85. For a thorough discussion on proposed changes to E-Verify of 2008, see Austin T. Fragomen,
Political Deadlock: Update on Immigration Legislation in the 110th Congress, in 41ST ANNUAL
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, at 13 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 13921, 2008).
86. Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 110329, §§ 106(3), 143, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575, 3580 (2008).
87. 604 CONG. REC. S2643 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions); Amendment
604, CR-S2643 (proposed Mar. 9, 2009).
88. Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 101, 123 Stat. 524, Division J (2009)
(“SEC. 101. Sections 143, 144, and 145 of division A of the Consolidated Security, Disaster
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 110-329; 122 Stat. 3580 et seq.)
are each amended by striking ‘the date specified in section 106(3) of this joint resolution’ and
inserting ‘September 30, 2009’”).
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program retains the optional character established in IIRIRA.
E-Verify is now available in all fifty states as well as some territories.
DHS estimates that E-Verify covers ten percent of new hires in the
United States today,89 with more than sixty-six thousand employers
making more than three million queries per year.90 Proponents of EVerify argue that it provides an effective screening tool without relying
on private employers for enforcement: immigration officials determine
the authenticity of an employee’s documentation, and employees contest
and pursue tentative non-confirmations.91 Proponents also argue that EVerify reduces selective enforcement of document review and more
easily exposes employers who hire undocumented workers.92
The system has flaws, though, as even the government concedes. A
government report confirmed that basic database errors create
problems.93 For example, the Social Security Administration estimates
that more than four percent of its records, containing information about
approximately eighteen million individuals, have errors related to the
person’s name, birth date, or citizenship status.94 These errors make
naturalized citizens thirty times more likely to receive a tentative nonconfirmation than natural-born citizens.95 Critics also note that
89. Stewart Baker, Debunking the “E-Verify Capacity Problem,” HOMELAND SEC. LEADERSHIP
J., May 21, 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/05/debunking-e-verify-capacityproblem.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/
84washlrev289n89.pdf.
90. Id. Data suggest that large employers are the most likely to use the system. Ten percent of
new U.S. hires are verified by E-Verify. These new hires, however, work for only one percent of the
nation’s employers. See Micah Bump, Immigration, Technology, and the Worksite: The Challenges
of Electronic Employment Verification, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 399 (2008).
91. Stephen A. Brown, Illegal Immigrants in the Workplace: Why Electronic Verification Benefits
Employers, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 349, 384–86 (2007).
92. Id. at 387–89.
93. WESTAT REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FINDINGS OF THE WEB
B ASIC P ILOT E VALUATION 56–58 (2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/
WebBasicPilotRprtSept2007.pdf (“The accuracy of the USCIS [United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services] database used for verification has improved substantially since the start of
the Basic Pilot program. However, further improvements are needed, especially if the Web Basic
Pilot becomes a mandated national program.”), permanent copy available at http://www.law.
washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n93a.pdf; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
ERECTING ITS OWN TOMBSTONE: ARIZONA’S MANDATORY E-VERIFY/BASIC PILOT LAW 1 (2008),
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/state_local/AZ_factsheet_2008--04-25.pdf, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n93b.pdf; Bump, supra note
90, at 393.
94. Bump, supra note 90, at 393–94.
95. WESTAT REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 93, at 97; see
also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 93, at 1.
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individuals wishing to contest tentative non-confirmations may not be
able to do so effectively during the ten-day time limit, due in part to a
requirement that employees produce original documents, which must be
requested from the country of origin.96 The limited operational hours of
federal and state agencies also frustrate employee efforts since agency
hours often conflict with work schedules.97
III. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE INVALIDATES STATE OR
LOCAL LAWS THAT EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that the laws
of the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”98
This clause is the grounds for the doctrine of federal preemption, which
voids state or local laws that run counter to federal law.99
Congress’s purpose for enacting the statute “is the ultimate
touchstone in every preemption case.”100 Congress may indicate its
intent to preempt state laws “through a statute’s express language or
through its structure and purpose.”101 Under the doctrine of implied field
preemption, courts infer that federal law has preempted an entire field of
regulation, absent an express declaration of congressional intent, if “the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion.”102
Finally, courts will also find that federal law preempts state law when it
is physically impossible to simultaneously comply with the state and
federal laws,103 or where a state law undermines congressional goals.104
96. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 93, at 1–2.
97. Id. at 2.
98. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
99. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000); Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
100. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)) (internal citations omitted).
101. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (citing Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
102. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
103. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (stating that implied conflict
preemption occurs where it is “‘impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements’” (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990))).
104. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (finding that conflict preemption under the
category of frustration of purpose exists when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
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Courts begin their preemption analysis “with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”105 Courts generally interpret a statute to disfavor
preemption,106 and also apply a presumption against preemption “with
particular force” if Congress legislates in an area of traditional state
power.107
IV. THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT REQUIRES
PRIVATE EMPLOYERS TO USE E-VERIFY
Frustration with recent deadlock on immigration reform has prompted
states throughout the country to take matters into their own hands. Three
states have passed laws requiring all public and private employers to use
E-Verify; eight have required state agencies and public contractors to
use the program; and additional states are considering similar
legislation.108 On the other end of the spectrum, one state has prohibited
public and private employers from using the program until E-Verify’s
accuracy improves.109
A.

Arizona’s E-Verify Law Requires All Public and Private Employers
to Use E-Verify

In 2007, the Arizona State Legislature grappled with ways to reduce
the number of undocumented workers, who represent approximately ten
percent of the state’s workforce.110 One solution that emerged was to
require all employers to use E-Verify. Debate in the Legislature reflected
a wide range of attitudes regarding immigration and Arizona’s role in
the federal immigration system. Some representatives argued that
immigration is a “federal issue”111 and that the proposed solution
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”).
105. Altria Group., 129 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)) (internal quotations omitted; alterations in original).
106. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
107. Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1995)).
108. See infra Part IV.A–B.
109. See infra Part IV.C.
110. PEW HISPANIC CTR., ARIZONA: POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS, 2000–
2006, at 1 (2008), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/37.pdf, permanent copy
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/84washlrev289n110.pdf.
111. Fair and Legal Employment Act: Hearing on H.B. 2779 Before the S. Comm. on

302

FELLER 5-22-09.DOC

5/22/2009 4:03 PM

Preempting State E-Verify Regulations
represented “unfair” treatment of “individuals that come over [to the
United States] without documents.”112 Other representatives bemoaned
the impact of immigration on Arizona, with one senator comparing “the
impact of illegal immigration [to that of] a nuclear bomb” that devastates
the areas it hits.113
After months of debate and amendments, the Legislature passed the
Legal Arizona Workers Act, which prohibits employers from knowingly
hiring undocumented workers,114 and requires them to use E-Verify to
confirm the employment eligibility of all new hires after December 31,
2007.115 The Act creates a complex system of investigation,
adjudication, and sanctions, including revocation of employers’ business
licenses.116 It defines “knowingly employ an unauthorized alien” by
reference to federal law,117 and allows judges to consider a range of
factors when deciding how to sanction an employer.118
When Governor Janet Napolitano119 signed the bill into law, she
celebrated Arizona’s actions while simultaneously criticizing Congress’s
inaction.120 She noted that by enacting this law, Arizona took “the most
Appropriations, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of Sen. Aboud, Member, S. Comm. on
Appropriations) (“This is a federal issue.”); id. (statement of Sen. Hale, Member, S. Comm. on
Appropriations) (“This is a federal responsibility.”); see also Fair and Legal Employment Act:
Minority Report on H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of Rep. Gallardo) (“I
stand opposed to HB 2779 (The Fair and Legal Employment Act) because it is a piecemeal,
unconstitutional immigration scheme. Only the Federal Government can truly propose a resolution
to our broken immigration system.”).
112. Fair and Legal Employment Act: Hearing on H.B. 2779 Before the S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of Sen. Garcia, Member, S. Comm. on
Appropriations).
113. Id. (statement of Sen. Huppenthal).
114. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-215 (West 2007).
115. Id. § 23-214.
116. Id. §§ 23-212(C)–(F).
117. Id. § 23-211(8) (“‘Knowingly employ an unauthorized alien’ means the actions described in
8 United States Code § 1324a. This term shall be interpreted consistently with 8 United States Code
§1324a and any applicable federal rules and regulations.”).
118. Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(d) (“The court . . . shall consider the following factors . . . (i) The number
of unauthorized aliens employed by the employer. (ii) Any prior misconduct by the employer. (iii)
The degree of harm resulting from the violation. (iv) Whether the employer made good faith efforts
to comply with any applicable requirements. (v) The duration of the violation. (vi) The role of the
directors, officers or principals of the employer in the violation. (vii) Any other factors the court
deems appropriate.”).
119. Janet Napolitano was sworn in as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on
January 21, 2009.
120. Governor’s Message to House on H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of
Governor Janet Napolitano).
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aggressive action in the country against employers who knowingly or
intentionally hire undocumented workers.”121 Governor Napolitano
conceded that immigration is an area of “federal responsibility,”122 but
insisted that the state had “no choice but to take strong action to
discourage the further flow of illegal immigration through [its]
borders.”123 Recognizing that other states would likely follow Arizona’s
lead because of a national need for “a uniform and uniformly enforced
immigration law,” Governor Napolitano urged Congress to “act swiftly
and definitively to solve this problem at the national level.”124
B.

Two States Adopted Arizona’s Approach, While Many Others
Require Public Agencies and Contractors to Use E-Verify

Eleven other states have also adopted E-Verify provisions. The
Mississippi Employment Protection Act requires all employers to use EVerify, prohibits the knowing employment of undocumented workers,
and punishes non-compliance by revoking business licenses and public
contracts.125 The law makes Mississippi the first state to make working
without proper documentation a felony, with maximum penalties of five
years in prison and ten thousand dollars in fines.126 Georgia’s Security
and Immigration Compliance Act also requires that all employers use EVerify.127
Eight states require public employers or recipients of public contracts,
like contractors and sub-contractors, to use E-Verify.128 For example,
Colorado requires state contractors to use E-Verify, and treats
noncompliance as a breach of contract.129 Penalties for non-compliance
of the various state laws range from loss of contracts and business
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Mississippi Employment Protection Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3 (2008).
126. Id. § 71-11-3(8)(c)(i).
127. Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act, GA. CODE ANN., § 48-7-21.1 (2007).
128. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-102 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN., § 48-7-21.1 (2007);
Idaho Exec. Order No. 2006-40, (Dec. 13, 2006); Minnesota Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008);
Technical Corrections Act, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 259, § 23.1(a) (2006); Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1313 (2007); Illegal Immigration Control
Order, Rhode Island Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Mar. 27, 2008); Identity Documents and Verification
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-11-103 (2008).
129. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-102.
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licenses to tax penalties.
C.

Illinois Prohibited E-Verify’s Use by Employers Until the
Program’s Accuracy Improves

Illinois is the only state to have prohibited employers from
participating in E-Verify.130 The Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act
prohibits employers from using the program “until the Social Security
Administration (SSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
databases are able to make a determination on 99 percent of the tentative
non-confirmation notices issued to employers within 3 days, unless
otherwise required by federal law.”131 The statute makes an exception
for employers who attest, under penalty of perjury, that they have
completed E-Verify’s training program, posted notices regarding
participation and non-discrimination,132 and that they recognize special
responsibilities under Illinois and federal law.133
V.

COURTS ARE DIVIDED ON WHETHER FEDERAL LAW
PREEMPTS STATE E-VERIFY LAWS

Several state and local E-Verify laws have prompted lawsuits, and
plaintiffs have generally alleged that federal law preempts state and local
regulation of undocumented workers. The Ninth Circuit is the only
circuit to confront one of these laws, and it upheld the Legal Arizona
Workers Act against a facial challenge.
A.

The Ninth Circuit Held that IRCA Does Not Preempt Arizona’s EVerify Statute Because License Revocation Falls Within IRCA’s
Savings Clause

In Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano,134 the Ninth Circuit rejected
a facial preemption challenge to the Legal Arizona Workers Act brought

130. In March 2009, an Illinois federal district court invalidated the Illinois provision under the
Supremacy Clause. United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12,
2009).
131. Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55 § 12(a)
(LexisNexis 2007).
132. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55 § 12(b).
133. Id. § 12(c).
134. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), amending on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, and
superseding Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
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by various civil-rights organizations and businesses. The court applied a
strong presumption against preemption. Relying on DeCanas v. Bica,135
it found that “the authority to regulate unauthorized workers is ‘within
the mainstream’ of the state’s police powers.”136 The court also
distinguished Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,137 a more
recent Supreme Court case finding that “IRCA ‘forcefully’ made
combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘[t]he policy of
immigration law.’”138 For the Ninth Circuit panel, the case was not on
point, because it did not involve preemption or state regulation.139
The court’s express-preemption analysis focused on IRCA’s
preemption clause, which expressly invalidates all state “civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”140 The state argued that the
law fell within the scope of the licensing exception because its potential
sanctions only affected business licensing, while the immigrant-rights
groups and business coalitions argued that the licensing exception
reached only licenses to engage in particular professions, like business
or law.141
The court treated the Arizona law as any other state licensing law,
concluding that it did “no more than impose conditions on state licenses
to do business.”142 For the court, this alone placed the Arizona
regulations squarely within the licensing exception. A study of the
legislative history reinforced the court’s conclusion that “states can
condition an employer’s ‘fitness to do business’ on hiring documented
workers.”143 The court acknowledged that state regulation of
immigration would have been impermissible but decided that the Act
was not an immigration regulation, because “the Act does not attempt to
define who is eligible or ineligible to work under our [federal]

135. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
136. Chicanos por la Causa, 558 F.3d at 864 (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356, 365).
137. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
138. Id. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 and n.8
(1991)).
139. Chicanos por la Causa, 558 F.3d at 865 (“We conclude that, because the power to regulate
the employment of unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police powers, an
assumption of non-preemption applies here.”).
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
141. Chicanos por la Causa, 558 F.3d at 864–67.
142. Id. at 864.
143. Id. at 866.
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immigration laws.”144
The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that the Arizona law
conflicted with IRCA by requiring employers to participate in a program
Congress had made voluntary.145 According to the court, the voluntary
nature of the federal program did not indicate that Congress had
prohibited states from mandating participation.146 In fact, the court found
that the Arizona law promoted congressional goals: “Though Congress
did not mandate E-Verify, Congress plainly envisioned and endorsed an
increase in its usage. The Act’s requirement that employers participate in
E-Verify is consistent with and furthers this purpose.”147
In March 2009, the Ninth Circuit amended the opinion and
simultaneously rejected a petition to hear the case en banc.148 The
amendment rejected the plaintiff’s implied-preemption argument that
federal law preempted state sanctions because they were harsher than
federal IRCA sanctions. The court described the argument as
“essentially speculative,” noting that Arizona had yet to sanction a
business for violating the Legal Arizona Workers Act.149
B.

Other Courts Have Reached Different Conclusions as to Whether a
Presumption Against Preemption Applies and Whether Federal
Law Preempts State and Local E-Verify Provisions

While the Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
have considered state E-Verify regulations, four federal district courts
have also grappled with the issue, and each has reached different results.
Their decisions have turned, in large part, on whether they framed EVerify laws as immigration regulations or employment regulations.
In Lozano v. City of Hazleton,150 the District Court for the Middle
144. Id.
145. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s initial decision did not address field preemption.
146. Id. at 866–67.
147. Id. at 986. The court also noted that “‘[l]icensing generally refers to ‘a governmental body’s
process of issuing a license,’ and a ‘license’ is ‘a permission, usually revocable, to commit some act
that would otherwise be unlawful.’” Id. at 984 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 940, 938 (8th
ed. 2004) (internal citations omitted)).
148. Chicanos por la Causa, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), amending on denial of rehearing and
rehearing en banc, and superseding Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2008).
149. Id. at 860.
150. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527 (2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3531
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District of Pennsylvania overturned a city ordinance making it unlawful
for an employer “to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or continue
to employ . . . any person who is an unlawful worker”151 and requiring,
among other things, the use of E-Verify.152 For the court, the ordinance
was not a licensing statute; it was an immigration law, which meant that
a presumption against preemption did not apply.153 The court held that
IRCA expressly preempted the local law because this type of license
revocation would render “the express preemption clause nearly
meaningless”154 by allowing states to impose the “ultimate,” businessruining sanction.155 The court also held that the federal interest and
pervasive regulation of the field of immigration impliedly preempted
Hazleton’s law.156 The city ordinance, according to the court, directly
conflicted with IRCA because the voluntary nature of the federal
provision could not be reconciled with the mandatory nature of the local
law.157 Finally, the ordinance conflicted with congressional purpose by
striking a balance between preventing employment of undocumented
workers and burdening employers that was different from the balance
that Congress had struck.158
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Henry,159 the District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Oklahoma from enforcing a state law requiring
state agencies and those contractors and sub-contractors receiving public
contracts to use E-Verify on new hires. The law punishes violations with
tax penalties and contract revocations. The Oklahoma court agreed with

(3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2007). See generally Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal”
Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do
About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2007) (examining the constitutionality of municipal ordinances
sanctioning businesses that employ undocumented workers).
151. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (quoting Ordinance 2006-18 at § 4.A).
152. Id. at 527.
153. Id. at 518 n.41.
154. Id. at 519.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 521–25.
157. Id. at 527. The court also noted that the time frames of the local ordinance directly conflicted
with IRCA. Id.
158. Id. at 528 (stating that both laws seek “to prevent the employment of persons not authorized
to work in the United States while not overburdening the employer in determining whether an
employee or perspective employee is an authorized worker”).
159. No. Civ-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164 (W.D. Okla. Jun. 4, 2008) (order granting preliminary
injunction), appeal docketed, No. 08-06204 (10th Cir. Jun. 16, 2008).
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the Lozano court that the employment of undocumented workers is
“central to the policy of immigration law” and found that the Oklahoma
law would likely operate in an area “typically reserved for congressional
action.”160 The court also found that the plaintiffs would likely show that
the tax and contract measures were actually civil sanctions expressly
preempted by IRCA.161
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected the
approach of the Lozano and Henry courts in Gray v. City of Valley
Park,162 upholding a city ordinance that prohibits private employers
from hiring undocumented workers and penalizes violations by revoking
business licenses. The ordinance provides a safe harbor for businesses
that use E-Verify.163 The court described the law as a typical state
licensing regulation, and, relying on DeCanas, the court applied a strong
presumption against preemption in what it described as “an area of law
traditionally governed by the states, the regulation of business
licenses.”164 Rejecting the argument that federal law impliedly
preempted the regulation, the court found that “IRCA does not manifest
an intent of Congress to occupy the entire field of immigration law.”165
Finally, the court found that the city ordinance did not conflict with
federal law because it was physically possible to comply with both
laws,166 and because the local ordinance mirrored federal requirements
by making E-Verify optional.167
In March 2009, the District Court for the Central District of Illinois
decided the only case in which the federal government challenged a state
E-Verify law. In United States v. Illinois,168 the Department of
Homeland Security sought to invalidate the Illinois Right to Privacy in
the Workplace Act, which prohibits employers’ use of E-Verify until the
program becomes more effective, arguing it conflicted with IIRIRA and

160. Id. at *6, *8.
161. Id. at *7.
162. No. 4:07-cv-00881, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
163. Id. at *8 (“[T]his Court must determine whether the Ordinance in question involves an area
of law traditionally governed by the states, the regulation of business licenses, or an area
traditionally governed by the Federal government, immigration.”).
164. Id.
165. Id. at *13.
166. Id. at *13–16.
167. Id. at *17–19.
168. No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
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was therefore preempted.169 The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the United States, determining that because “Congress intended
that any employer should be able to participate in [E-Verify,]” the
Illinois law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”170 The court further
noted that since Congress made E-Verify available in all fifty states,
Illinois may not “say no, or require the federal government to meet
Illinois’ standards.”171
E-Verify litigation remains unsettled and continues to grow.172 Both
Lozano and Henry are on appeal, to the Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit
respectively.173 Part VI demonstrates that judges facing a state law
involving E-Verify should not rely on Chicanos por la Causa, Inc. v.
Napolitano—the only appellate-court decision yet to address the issue.
VI. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY PERMITTING ARIZONA
TO SANCTION EMPLOYERS WITHOUT A PRIOR FEDERAL
IRCA VIOLATION
Chicanos por la Causa frames the Legal Arizona Workers Act as an
employment law that falls within the historic exercise of state police
powers. The Ninth Circuit panel said that DeCanas made it clear that
states can regulate the employment of undocumented workers. Because
Congress abrogated the central tenants of DeCanas when it passed IRCA
in 1986, the court wrongly concluded that state authority over
immigrant-employment remains intact today.
A.

Two Decades of Federal Legislation Have Abrogated the Central
Tenets of DeCanas v. Bica and Created the Federal Regulatory
Field of Immigration-Related Employment Practices
When the Ninth Circuit found a presumption against preemption by

169. Id. at *1.
170. Id. at *2 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Chertoff, No. 8:08-cv-03444-AW
(S.D. Md. Dec. 23, 2008) (challenging Executive Order 13,465 as a violation of IIRIRA because it
requires federal contractors to participate in E-Verify ).
173. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Henry, No. Civ-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164
(W.D. Okla. Jun. 4, 2008) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 08-06204
(10th Cir. Jun. 16, 2008); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), appeal
docketed, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2007).
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classifying the law as an employment regulation, it misinterpreted the
fundamental changes in federal legislation since IRCA’s enactment.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s decision ignored a field of federal
regulation: immigration-related employment practices.
Federal law has included the regulation of immigrant employment,
specifically undocumented workers, since Congress passed IRCA in
1986. Congress expressly noted that “the immigration laws of the United
States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly,”174 and amended
existing law to make immigrant employment a central focus of federal
immigration policy.175 Since IRCA, the federal government has occupied
the field of immigrant employment for two decades, issuing and
amending regulations relating to I-9 forms, establishing and maintaining
E-Verify to ensure employer compliance, and creating and amending
penalties for non-compliance.176
The Ninth Circuit was wrong to rely on DeCanas because the case
was decided ten years before Congress brought employment of
immigrants to the forefront and thereby completely reshaped federal
immigration law. When the Supreme Court decided DeCanas in 1976,
the INA did not contain a single provision prohibiting the employment
of undocumented workers. For the Court, this absence of regulation
meant Congress had expressed only “a peripheral concern with
employment of illegal entrants.”177 The DeCanas Court’s decision relied
on this void in federal law to conclude that Congress had intended to
allow states to continue to regulate the employment of undocumented
workers.178 In fact, the Court’s dictum that the California law could
stand only “absent federal regulation”179 suggested that the Court would
come to a different conclusion if Congress were to act. Now, Congress
has acted. By passing IRCA ten years later, Congress manifested a clear
intent to comprehensively regulate the employment of undocumented
workers.
174. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
(emphasis added).
175. The Supreme Court has recognized that “IRCA forcefully made combating the employment
of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S.
183, 194 (1991) (internal markings omitted)).
176. See supra Part II.
177. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976).
178. Id. (“Congress believes this problem [of hiring undocumented workers] does not yet require
uniform national rules and is appropriately addressed by the States as a local matter.”).
179. Id. at 356.
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The way courts frame the issue influences the ultimate holding in EVerify cases: the court that treated the state law as an employment
regulation upheld the law,180 while courts that treated the state laws as
immigration regulations have usually invalidated them.181 Courts need
not address E-Verify cases within the absolute categories of either
“employment” or “immigration.” Instead, courts should recognize the
established federal field of immigration-related employment practices,
and examine state and local E-Verify laws by applying this more exact
framework.
B.

States May Sanction Employers for Knowingly Hiring
Undocumented Workers Only if the Federal Government First
Determines that the Employer Violated IRCA

IRCA’s preemption clause prohibits a state from revoking business
licenses unless the federal government has found that an employer
knowingly hired undocumented workers. States may impose their own
punishments on offenders, but only after the federal government has
found a violation. IRCA’s text and legislative history, the federal
government’s ongoing debates about undocumented workers, and the
need for uniformity in immigration enforcement all support the
conclusion that federal law preempts the Legal Arizona Workers Act.
Chicanos por la Causa is in error because, by allowing Arizona to
leverage state licensing power into state regulations affecting the hiring
of undocumented workers, the decision permits Arizona to interfere with
important national interests that call for national solutions.
The express-preemption clause states, in its entirety, that “[t]he
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil
or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing or similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,

180. Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009), amending on denial
of rehearing and rehearing en banc, and superseding Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 544
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
181. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Henry, No. Civ-08-109-C, 2008 WL
2329164, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Jun. 4, 2008) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal
docketed, No. 08-06204 (10th Cir. Jun. 16, 2008); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477,
527 (2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2007). Because of the procedural
posture of Henry, it is unclear whether the court will ultimately find the law to be unconstitutional.
But see Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07-cv-00881, 2008 WL 294294, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
31, 2008) (relying on DeCanas to find that “IRCA does not manifest an intent of Congress to
occupy the entire field of immigration law”).
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unauthorized aliens.”182 While the express-preemption clause is silent as
to whether states can impose licensing sanctions independent of a
finding that an employer violated IRCA, the House Judiciary Committee
Report sheds some light on the clause’s meaning:
The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to
specifically preempt any state or local laws providing civil fines
and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of
undocumented aliens. They are not intended to preempt or
prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the
suspension, revocation or refusal to reissue a license to any
person who has been found to have violated the sanctions
provisions of this legislation.183
The Report shows that Congress intended state business-license
sanctions to affect only one class of employers: those that had been
found to have violated IRCA. The Report says that states may impose
licensing sanctions only upon a “person who has been found to have
violated the sanctions provisions of this legislation.”184 The language of
the Report shows that a finding of a violation must precede any state
action, and therefore that the only employers to face state sanctions are
those previously found to have violated federal law. Moreover, as “this
legislation”185 refers to IRCA, not to state law, the Report demonstrates
that the only violation that qualifies is a violation of federal law. Finally,
the Report refers to “state or local processes,”186 which are distinct from
the substantive requirements that state or local law might impose. The
Report therefore reinforces an interpretation of the statute that allows
states to impose their own sanctions after a violation of federal law has
182. Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (1986). But see Gray v. City
of Valley Park, No. 4:07-cv-00881, 2008 WL 294294, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (determining
that “the wording of the statute is perfectly clear” and concluding that “[t]here is no requirement in
the statute that a finding be made by the federal government that a person has employed, recruited
or referred for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens, only that those are the individuals who
are subject to penalty”).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1 at 58 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. The
Report continues: “Further, the committee does not intend to preempt licensing or ‘fitness to do
business laws,’ such as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which specifically require
such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring, recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.” This
clause does not affect the analysis of this Comment: State licensing or fitness-to-business laws that
prohibit the employment of undocumented workers are enforceable, but only the federal
government has the authority to find that an employer did so.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
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been determined, but that forbids them from issuing substantive
regulations affecting immigrant-employment, whether licensing laws or
otherwise.
Allowing Arizona to sanction private employers187 without a prior
federal finding of wrongdoing runs contrary to the federal government’s
increased regulation of undocumented workers and creates the
possibility of inconsistent results. If Arizona can revoke business
licenses for violations of the Legal Arizona Workers Act, it would be
possible for an employer to win its federal hearing but lose in state
proceedings, and thus still be sanctioned.188 If Arizona could impose the
“ultimate sanction”189 of revoking an employer’s business license for
behavior that does not rise to the level of an IRCA violation, it could
upset the enforcement scheme contemplated by Congress, which
carefully balances burdens on employers and employees and vests
discretionary authority in the Attorney General. The Legal Arizona
Workers Act is preempted because it does not rely on a federal violation
of IRCA to revoke business licenses. Instead, it establishes its own
standards and procedures for determining knowledge, allowing for
public complaint and investigations. All of these provisions run contrary
to the prerequisite that an employer first be found to have violated
IRCA, and these regulations could result in conflicting federal and state
enforcement of immigrant-employment laws.
Additionally, the federal government’s increased use and continued
extension of E-Verify demonstrate a clear federal interest in regulating
undocumented workers.190 Rather than proffering support for state EVerify-related sanctions,191 the continued endorsement of E-Verify at the
187. It is likely that Arizona, in its capacity as an employer, could require state agencies to use EVerify on new hires. However, as this use of E-Verify would not include sanctions or license
revocation, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
188. But see Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2007)
(finding that the “Act’s adjudicatory procedures do not conflict with federal law merely because a
State Superior Court judge and a federal administrative law judge could disagree about the
evidence”), aff’d, Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009),
amending on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, and superseding Chicanos por la Causa v.
Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
189. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 519 (2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-3531
(3d Cir. Aug. 30, 2007).
190. See supra Part II.B; see also United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D.
Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
191. See Chicanos por la Causa, 558 F.3d at 867 (“Here, E-Verify is a federal government
service that Congress has implicitly strongly encouraged by expanding its duration and its
availability (to all fifty states) . . . . Though Congress did not mandate E-Verify, Congress plainly
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federal level evidences the growth of the federal field of immigrationrelated employment practices. In light of this trend, Congress, not states,
set the terms of E-Verify usage and resulting sanctions.192
In sum, IRCA and twenty-three years of federal regulation have
created a field of law occupied exclusively by the federal government:
immigration-related employment practices. The Ninth Circuit erred in
Chicanos por la Causa in two ways: first, by relying on Supreme Court
precedent that predates that regulatory field, and second, by assuming
the Arizona law was either an employment regulation or an immigration
regulation. Courts facing this issue in the many cases currently working
their way through the federal courts, as well as those that will face the
issue in litigation sure to come, should reject the Ninth Circuit’s
approach. Instead, regardless of whether or not a state calls an E-Verify
provision a “licensing” regulation, courts should recognize the
comprehensive nature of federal immigrant-employment regulation and
find that federal law preempts any state law that interferes with the
federal scheme.
CONCLUSION
The faulty framework used by the Ninth Circuit to analyze Arizona’s
E-Verify statute calls attention to important points of analysis that courts
should consider when determining whether a state E-Verify regulation
falls within IRCA’s savings clause or is expressly preempted by federal
law. First, courts should think carefully about how they choose to frame
E-Verify laws and should explain in detail the rationale for adopting a
particular framework. As demonstrated by recent court opinions, the
decision to frame E-Verify as an employment or an immigration law is
highly predictive of the outcome. For this reason, courts should consider
framing these laws as neither “immigration” nor “employment” laws,
but as what the laws really are: immigrant-employment laws.
Additionally, courts should examine what a state law actually does,
rather than the terminology the regulation employs. That is, if a state law
merely stacks consequences on an employer that has already been found
by the federal government to have violated IRCA, then it is likely
acceptable. If, however, the statute requires a state finding of knowing
envisioned and endorsed an increase in its usage.”); Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07-cv00881, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008).
192. See Illinois, 2009 WL 662703, at *2 (noting that Congress, not Illinois, dictates the testing,
length of testing, availability, and usage of E-Verify).
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employment of an undocumented worker, as in the Legal Arizona
Workers Act, courts should tread warily.
Attempts to reform the U.S. immigration system continue at the
federal level as states and municipalities independently seek to reduce
the employment of undocumented workers. As a result, E-Verify—and
the consistency with which courts interpret E-Verify provisions—will
remain an important issue for immigrants, employers, legislators, and
courts.
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